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BEYOND NEW IMPERIALISM: A NEW TRANSNATIONAL REGULATORY 
GOVERNANCE 
This paper argues that events in the aftermath of September 11 have intensified a move 
towards a more authoritarian and regulatory global order. The paper presents two central 
arguments. First, that the events of September 11 should not be seen in simple terms as a 
reassertion of US hegemony. On the contrary, the emerging regulatory order is to be found 
within the internal transformation of the state—a transformation characterised here as the 
‘new transnational regulatory governance’. Secondly, we argue that the post cold war global 
order signals a decisive break with the Westphalian notion of statehood. Notions of 
hegemony and new imperialism are trapped within the Westphalian framework. In contrast, 
we argue that the intensification of global capitalism creates the conditions for the emergence 
of new webs of regulatory governance that link capitalist states together in a way similar to 
Kautsky’s (1978) notion of ultra imperialism. It is within this version of ultra imperialism 
that we seek to locate Southeast Asia’s role in the global order. 
Neo liberalism then, the essay suggests, is a constantly evolving and dynamic project. 
Initially neo liberalism was identified with the retreat of the state from economic 
governance—if you like, the Thatcherite incarnation of neo liberalism. However, as 
economic reform has consolidated, Thatcherite neo liberalism and its predatory 
understanding of the state was replaced by a greater emphasis on the regulatory dimension of 
economic management. Regulatory neo liberalism replaced the predatory understanding of 
state intervention with a more enabling view of state that seeks the effective reproduction of 
economic order. Notwithstanding the effect of September 11 the basic parameters of this 
regulatory neo liberalism remain much the same, although it has been recast within a 
framework of securitisation. More to the point, changes in the global order in the aftermath of 
9/11 are located within a broader process of the intensification and consolidation of a system 
of transnational regulatory governance. It is in this context that transnational regulatory 
governance provides a useful heuristic framework to understand the transformed global geo 
political economy.  
Hence the argument in this paper stands in sharp contrast to explanations which view 
the role of the US in the post September 11 period as reflecting an intensification of US 
hegemony or a more coercive US military posture in the global political economy. Such 
explanations tend to obscure the fact that this intensification of US hegemony takes place in a 
context where there has been a far reaching transformation of the global order since the end 
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of the cold war. Transnational regulatory governance ushers in a post Westphalian global 
order that needs to be clearly distinguished from those suggesting that recent US foreign 
policy marks a shift from a so called ‘benevolent’ hegemony, typified by its posture in the 
post war period, to a more militaristic and coercive stance. For Perry Anderson (2002) the 
end of the cold war together with the advance of economic globalisation changed the 
equilibrium between force and consent that drove US policy in the post Second World War 
period . Instead, in the aftermath of the cold war the balance tilted towards a more coercive 
hegemony as: 
with the erasure of the USSR, there was no longer any countervailing force 
capable of withstanding US military might. The days when it could be 
checkmated in Vietnam, or suffer proxy defeat in Southern Africa were over. 
These interrelated changes were eventually bound to alter the role of the United 
States in the World. The chemical formula of power was in solution (Anderson 
2002: 7).  
There is much to be said for this argument, and to be sure, the recent pattern of US foreign 
unilateralist policy in Iraq, the war on terror, as well its unwillingness to ratify international 
agreements or be bound by collective security institutions seem to tilt the odds sharply in 
favour of the view that there is a rebalancing of forces and consent in the operation of US 
hegemony. Yet, I think this remains very much a picture that in one sense assumes that 
international politics continues along the muddy streams of ‘realist’ international politics 
except that now it passes through a distinctly unipolar landscape. But herein lies the problem: 
this line of reasoning tends to elide the significant transformation in the nature of the state as 
well as the broader global environment in which it operates. Most accounts of hegemony, or 
indeed the recent popularity of the term ‘Empire’, seem to miss the decisive way in which 
recent changes in the global order reflect a far deeper mutation in the modes and mechanisms 
of political rule that are embodied in arrangement of transnational regulatory governance. It is 
these new forms of political rule which rupture Westphalian notions of statehood that have 
been so central to global politics. In essence it is transformation of the regulatory state rather 
than the enhanced role of the US that is the stimulus for change within the global political 
and economic system.  
At the core of this framework of transnational regulatory governance is not the 
relationship between the US and interstate system but the transformation that is occurring 
within the state itself. But, this is not to suggest that there is some kind of supra national state 
that is supplanting the role of the national state apparatus but that the national state itself 
becomes the site of transnational governance. From this perspective, as Panitch (2002) 
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building on the earlier work of Poulantzas (1978) has recognised, the crucial point is that the 
dynamics of imperialism need to be approached through the internal byways of the capitalist 
state rather than from superhighway of US hegemony.  
Therefore, to analyse the post 9/11 era as the intensification of US hegemony or in 
fact in terms of a renewed importance of empire, is to be trapped within an essentially statist 
Westphalian framework of analysis that sees the international order in terms of a plurality of 
competing states. To be sure, this is a persuasive account of changes within the global order 
but I think it misses out on the fact the post cold war international order has been seen not so 
much as competition between states as the emergence of sets of closely connected regulatory 
structures of advanced capitalist states, but whose structures include key state structures and 
elements of pivotal newly industrial countries. Regulatory neo liberalism then results in the 
transnationalisation of various state structures and the social forces associated with these state 
practices. In essence, our argument is that for most of the 1990s this new transnational 
regulatory governance had been confined to predominantly economic issues, but since 9/11 
this has been extended to encompass security issues so that a broad gamut of economic and 
social domains of governance have become securitised.  
Instead, what is evident is the rise of a web of transnational connections and structures 
that link various capitalist states—a process that creates new forms of complex sovereignty in 
the global economy (Jayasuriya 1999). What is more, the emergence of this transnational 
regulatory governance signals a dramatic change from ‘Westphalian’ models of sovereignty. 
Instead, what we have is the embryonic form of a set of transnational state structures that cuts 
across traditionally defined national boundaries, thereby in effect creating a new post 
Westphalian state and international order. There is no single sovereign centre within the 
global order; neither can the global order be reducible to our usual ‘Westphalian’ order of 
multiple and pluralist sovereign units within the global order. It is sovereignty itself which is 
being rapidly reconfigured. Of course Hardt and Negri (2000) in their much discussed book 
on empire make this a central focus of their analysis, but the almost mystical nature of what 
they assume to be a new decentralised sovereignty obscures the transformation that is 
occurring not just in the regulation of the global economic order but also in hard edged 
security issues. More relevant for our purpose is a version of the globality1 proposed by Shaw 
(2000). Shaw suggests that a globality may be found ‘in the dominance of a single set of new 
norms and institutions, which more or less governs the various state centres’. In turn, Shaw’s 
notion of globality has a resemblance to early work of Kehoane and Nye’s (1977) on 
complex interdependence, as well as from a very different perspective to Kautsky’s (1970) 
 3
notion of ‘utra imperialism’—a term used to describe what he thought to be the deepening 
engagement between core capitalist countries that is driven by the imperatives of global as 
against a national capitalism. Indeed ultra imperialism captures much better the reality and 
complexity of the new transnational regulatory governance than the notions of empire, 
hegemony, or indeed new imperialism, all of which remain stuck with an outmoded 
‘Westphalian model of sovereignty and the state.  
However, despite the evident value of utra imperialism as an analytical framework it 
has limitations in comprehending the post Westphalian global order, and in particular we 
need to recognise that in this new global order what is really at issue is the way the domestic 
state apparatus becomes increasingly integrated within a broader arrangement of transnational 
regulatory governance. The point is that it is the internal transformation of the state, not the 
relationship between states and the US hegemony or empire, that lies at the core of the new 
transnational regulatory governance and the emerging global order. Undeniably the political 
frame of transnational regulatory governance must be broad and flexible enough to 
encompass different political projects within this transnational entity (to call this a ‘state’ I 
think would leave us mired in a Westphalian confusion). Nevertheless, it does enable us to 
explore how the emerging global capitalism can be framed in terms of these new 
transnational political structures that go beyond the boundaries of the national and the 
international.  
But is the militarization of the global order since the event of 9/11 a continuation of 
regulatory governance that has advanced since the 1990s or something qualitatively 
different? Indeed some writers have suggested that the events of September 11 reflect a move 
away from the dominant themes of economic globalisation towards more security oriented 
issues. In an incisive argument Lipschutz (2002) has suggested that this re-orientation is from 
what he calls ‘disciplinary neo liberalism’ to one based much more on the military might of 
the US. There is no doubt that this is a powerful argument delineating the way in which the 
regulation of the global order has shifted from a predominately ‘soft’ decentralised and 
diffused system of regulation to more military dominated US based order. Indeed, Higgott 
has advanced a parallel argument that economic globalisation ‘is now seen not simply in neo 
liberal economic terms, but also through the lenses of the national security agenda of the 
United States’ (Higgott 2003: 5). Arguing along these lines, he suggests that US foreign 
economic policy is becoming increasingly securitised and this marks a significant change 
from the US foreign economic policy of the 1990s which sought to subordinate security to 
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economic concerns. In effect the greater militarisation of the global economy in the aftermath 
of the war on terror constrains the unbridled economic globalization of the 1990s. Hence, 
policies geared towards controlling globalization. unlike in the more laissez faire period 
of the last decades of the 20th century when the market alone was meant to drive it – have 
a much stronger place in US policy under the Bush Administration (Higgott (2003: 20).  
In the early decades of the 21st century both Lipschutz and Higgott seem to suggest economic 
globalisation will be subordinated to an increasingly securitized global agenda.  
While these arguments are persuasive in terms of the changed dynamics of economic 
globalisation in the post September 11 era, we need to be careful to make the distinction 
between the securitisation of globalisation or the state of exception as the political shell of the 
global order and the economics of this new global order which are still tethered to a form of 
economic globalisation. Securitisation of the global political order and a system of economic 
constitutionalism are not mutually exclusive. It is more useful to see the unfolding of the 
process of neo liberal globalisation as giving rise to a variegated series of governance projects 
throughout the last decade and a half, that have sought to recalibrate the engine of post war 
multilateralism—the ‘UN Republic’ to use Lipchutz’s terms. In the 1990s this system of 
economic constitutionalism, as Lipschutz and Higgott observe, was configured to a 
decentralised system of multilateralism which is now being replaced by a more coercive US 
based system of global governance. However, the events of September 11 gave way not only 
to a new governance project but also to one which sought to establish the foundations of a 
new global constitutional order; not just a recalibration but a reconstitution of the post war 
engine of international liberalism. Therefore, what is significant about the economic order 
post September 11 is the fact that economic constitutionalism is contained within a political 
core that operates outside the normal process of international legality. As Steinmetz (2003) 
aptly comments, global economic openness remains central to the US foreign policy 
objectives, but economic constitutionalism now functions within the more authoritarian frame 
of a global state of exception. None of this should be surprising as the experience of capitalist 
industrialisation in East Asia and elsewhere has shown us that markets are compatible with a 
diverse array of political forms. Likewise, global capitalism is compatible with a diverse 
array of political forms, and the events of September 11 signal a shift towards a more 
authoritarian political form, What is central to both the economic and more security oriented 
regulatory project is not the shift towards a more coercive policy by the US but the increasing 
transnationalisation of regulatory governance. 
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In a similar fashion, Robinson (2004) has used the notion of transnational state 
apparatus which is defined as ‘an emerging network that comprises transformed and 
externally integrated national states, together with the supranational economic and political 
forums, and has not yet acquired any centralised institutional form’ (Robinson 2004: 88). 
Central to Robinson’s claim is that economic globalisation has produced a new transnational 
capitalist class whose political counterpart is the emergence of a new transnational state 
apparatus. One of the strengths of this argument is that it forces us to explore how the 
national state has been transformed through the transnationalisation of state actors and 
institutions. It compels us to confront the way global capitalism has rendered conventional 
notions of statehood.  
Breslin, in an analysis of China and the new global political economy, notes the 
emergence of a group of globalised bureaucrats pointing out that  
This group, epitomised by the policies of Zhu Rongji, is engaged in a process of 
making the investment regime within China more and more liberalised and 
‘attractive’ to international capital, and reforming the domestic economic 
structure to reduce domestic protectionism, and institute a more neo-liberal 
economic paradigm. (Breslin 2002: 25). 
It is these ‘globalising bureaucrats’ that play a key role in the management of new systems of 
transnational regulatory governance. Hence it is the enrolment of these state actors in 
regulatory governance, the modes of governance within these new regulatory practices, and 
the unequal relationship between various sets of globalising bureaucrats that define the 
manner in which the new regulatory state is incorporated into the global order. One of the 
main changes after the events of September 11 is the emergence of new, more security 
oriented ‘globalising    bureaucrats who exert much more influence at both the national and 
transnational levels of governance. For example, in the growing area of military and security 
cooperation, we see not merely close inter state collaboration but a more profound process of 
the incorporation of these state actors within new security oriented transnational regulatory 
governance.  
As this indicates, what really marks out the notion of transnational regulatory 
governance is the fact that the compulsive pressure of economic globalisation or 
militarisation is located not outside the state but within its internal structures. Most 
proponents of new imperialism or renewed hegemony adopt an ‘outside in’ approach to 
globalisation, where the compulsive pressures of globalisation are located external to the 
state. Instead it is argued in this paper that these pressures of globalisation are located within 
the institutions of the state itself. This was of course a point that was central to Poulantzas’ 
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(1978a; 1978 b) analysis of the state nearly three decades ago. He argues that international 
functions of the state are no longer simply added on to the state but are the ‘expressions of 
their internalised transformations’ (Poulantzas 1978 :82). In a paper that seeks to build on 
these ideas, Panitch observes that Poultanzas’ achievement stands in contrast to the ‘various 
“regime” theories dominant in the field of international relations are manifestly unhelpful in 
understanding this development, misrepresenting as cooperative understandings what were in 
reality structural manifestations of a hierarchically organized international political economy’ 
(Panitch 2002: 13). And this is really the nub of our argument: the internal transformation of 
the state and the consequent interlocking web of regulatory governance within advanced 
capitalist countries that is the most distinctive property of the new transnational regulatory 
governance. This framework allows us to transcend the very distinction between the 
‘external’ and the ‘internal’ that so defines the realist understating of the global political 
economy—be it in the form of new hegemony or a new imperialism. On the contrary the 
thesis of this paper is that the new transnational regulatory governance is not a supra national 
entity above the national state but instantiated within it. Adopting such an approach has a 
two-fold advantage. First, it views the process of neo liberalism as a political rather than 
economic process, and this enables us to see neo liberalism as a constantly moving set of 
political projects within the state. Second, it brings back—as Panitch (2002) so well argues—
the state as the central site through which new programs of governance are being 
implemented and resisted. At a theoretical level, this means we should pay more attention to 
theories of the state in attempting to understand the dynamics of the new global order.  
What is most evident in this new regulatory order is the growth of a set of 
transnational connections and structures that link various capitalist states—a process that 
creates new forms of complex sovereignty in the global economy (Jayasuriya 1999). More 
especially the emergence of this transnational regulatory governance signals a dramatic 
change from ‘Westphalian’ models of sovereignty. Instead, what we have is the development 
of a new form of complex sovereignty that defines these new structures of transnational 
regulatory governance. We now turn to the analysis of this post Westphalian order and 
complex sovereignty.  
 
COMPLEX SOVEREIGNTY IN THE POST WESTPHALIAN GLOBAL ORDER  
Emerging forms of ‘complex sovereignty’ break down the internal structural coherence of the 
state replacing it with autonomous regulatory agencies whose purpose is to mediate between 
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the international and the local or national. The growth of polycentric centres of power within 
the state,2 therefore, internationalises certain agencies (e.g. central banks) within the state 
while at the same time serving to break down the boundaries between domestic and 
international politics/law. Again, these emergent properties of sovereignty pose important, 
even revolutionary, implications for the study of international law and politics. But—contrary 
to those who seek to describe this as a new ‘medievalism’—the argument advanced here 
reinforces the thesis that this is a transformation, not an erosion, of sovereignty.  
One of the cardinal features of the modern state—it is modern because, as Ruggie 
(1993) points out, the conjoint development of territoriality and sovereignty is part and parcel 
of the rise of modernity—is the development of ‘internal sovereignty’ or internal coherence 
within the state.3 A focal feature of the early state was the conflict between autonomous 
centres—be they corporate or ecclesiastical—as they sought to defend their prerogatives and 
immunities. However, one of the major achievements of the nineteenth century state was the 
development of the state as the exclusive centre of all authoritative decision making where 
the state institutionalised the principle of internal sovereignty and thereby established a 
unitary ‘monistic’ legal order (Poggi 1978).  
However—and this is the nub of the thesis developed here—with the globalisation of 
economic relations there is a growing incongruity between a territorial notion of sovereignty 
and the flow of economic activity which disrupts the internal unity or coherence of the state. 
Increasingly various agencies and institutions within the state develop a high degree of 
autonomy and independence;4 this fragmentation of the domestic order of the state is central 
to the development of international forms of regulatory governance. In short, the global 
governance of the economy requires the internationalisation of state agencies and institutions, 
but this can only occur if these institutions possess a degree of autonomy from other 
institutions within the state. In other words, the fragmentation of the state is the form that 
sovereignty takes in an increasingly global economy.  
A good example of this fragmentation or the disaggregation of the state is the 
development of independent central banks. Central bank independence provides a means of 
purchasing—albeit not always successfully—domestic stability through the credible 
commitment to pursue ‘market friendly’ monetary policy. One reason for the enhanced power 
of central banks is the growing importance of monetary policy in an era dominated by the 
demand for more global financial integration. It is important to recognise that these changes 
reflect not just a shift of policy instruments from fiscal to monetary policy, but also a 
reconfiguration of authority within the state towards agencies such as central banks. This was 
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not just a technical change to a new set of policy instruments, but a significant change in the 
mode of coordination within the state. In turn, this trend towards more independent central 
banks reflects profound structural changes in the international political economy, particularly 
the increasing importance of global transnational financial structures. Therefore, the 
emergence of independent central banks and the reconfiguration of the state that this implies 
are a manifestation of the deeper structural changes taking place in the global political 
economy, especially in the nature of international markets (Jayasuriya 1999).  
For our purposes what needs to be acknowledged is that although independent central 
banks are actively engaged in the regulation of international financial markets (e.g. through 
their critical role in implementing structural adjustment programs of the IMF), they 
participate in these regulatory systems as independent actors. In turn, these agencies are often 
required to implement international regulations or agreements at the national level (Slaughter 
1997); they remain ambiguously situated between the global and the national. The broader 
argument here is about the way that structural changes in the global political economy lead to 
changes in the form of state sovereignty. These changes serve to radically reconstitute our 
understanding of the traditional boundaries between the international and the domestic 
spheres because agencies such as independent central banks are simultaneously part of the 
domestic order and a range of global regulatory mechanisms. Such global regulatory 
mechanisms serve to underline the central insight of Kautsky’s notion of ultra-imperialism 
which was to pinpoint the way global capitalism’s old fashioned inter-state rivalry was to be 
made redundant in favour of a set of collaborative arrangements drew together the core 
capitalists powers . 
This allows us to move beyond the somewhat sterile debate between mulitilateralism 
and unipolarity. What this debate overlooks, I think, is the fact that recent changes in the 
global order reconstitute systems of internal governance. While unipolarity suggests a 
reinforced hegemony within the international system, it obscures the more important reality 
that new and innovative forms of governance are being constituted to manage the global 
economic and political order. Unipolarity or new imperialism remains stuck within the 
outdated categories of Westphalian statehood. For example, in the area of foreign economic 
policy, to the extent that multilateralism at both levels—regional and national—was chiefly 
concerned with trade liberalisation, it is now clear that this trade liberalisation agenda has run 
out of steam. Indeed, the pressing issues in the global economic environment are not so much 
trade liberalisation between ‘national economic entities’ but the imposition of new forms of 
regulatory governance within the state. This regional governance is distinguished by an 
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emphasis on the development of policy coordination and harmonization. This is a form of 
regulatory governance that should not be viewed as a departure from the disciplines of the 
global economy, but as an attempt to instantiate the disciplines of neo liberalism within the 
broader ensemble of regional governance. 
One such dimension of this post trade liberalisation agenda is the development of 
regional regulatory frameworks. This process has now been extensively documented in the 
EU but a similar dynamic discernable in the evolving process of regionalisation in East Asia 
is the mesh between emerging regulatory states and new patterns of regional governance. A 
crucial facet of this regional governance is the way it manages to locate the regional within 
the domestic. This reflects a recognition that region wide regulatory frameworks such as 
monetary coordination and macro economic policies can be implemented and policed at a 
local level. One nascent illustration of the emergence of this system of regional multilevel 
regulation is the ASEAN regional surveillance process (ASP) which was endorsed by 
ASEAN Financial Ministers in December 1998 (Manupipatpong 2002). What is clearly 
discernable with this ASP process is that it links the national and international regulatory 
governance through the internationalisation of various state agencies and actors. From this 
perspective, the regulatory state is not a state form confined to the territorial boundaries of the 
national state. Rather, it should be seen as a system of multilevel governance which connects 
international organizations, such as the IMF, with regional entities such as the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), and various national, and even sub national or local entities.  
But perhaps the most interesting development of these new regulatory mechanisms is 
through what has been termed the new bilateralism, that is, the increasing propensity of 
governments to enter into preferential trading agreements on a bilateral rather than a 
multilateral or regional basis. In fact bilateralism is ‘arguably the most dramatic development 
in intergovernmental relations in the western Pacific since the financial crises of 1997-98’ 
(Ravenhill 2004: 61). There are three important dimensions to this new bilateralism. First, 
and most importantly, bilateral arrangements are much more than a set of agreements about 
trade; it involves fundamental changes in the internal governance within the state. For 
example, it may involve requirements on corporate transparency that necessitates significant 
changes in national regimes of corporate governance. Similarly, most trade agreements with 
less developed countries place a stronger emphasis on the imposition of market disciplines 
than on the trade liberalisation itself. (Phillips 2004). Therefore, these bilateral agreements 
should be seen as part of a broader regulatory project reshaping the state by imposing 
economic disciplines.  
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Second, the shift towards bilateralism permits what may be called those ‘pivotal 
states’ at the centre of the regional geopolitical economy to establish deeper integration 
amongst themselves as well as be entrenched within the broader strategies of transnational 
governance. Within Southeast Asia, Singapore clearly performs such a role: it has FTA 
agreements with Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the US; and also has a number of other 
agreements under active negotiation (Dent 2004). In this case, we see how Singapore 
becomes a bilateral hub through which the new bilateralism is reconfiguring the regional 
order. Yet another example of this process of deep integration is the emerging Singapore-
Thailand economic and political partnership which has been formalised as the Singapore-
Thailand Enhanced Economic Relationship (STEER) framework. As Dent notes: 
This is institutionally anchored in the STEER framework, first announced in 
February 2002 and formally established by an inaugural summit convened in 
August 2003. At this meeting, Singapore and Thailand announced their intention 
to create a bilateral foundation for greater economic integration within the 
ASEAN based on a ‘one economy, two countries’ (Dent 2004: 7-8). 
STEER itself is a part of a broader partnership between Thailand and Singapore. Once again, 
the point here is how these framework agreements are not so much about trade liberalisation 
as the increasing integration of these states through these bilateral agreements with a broader 
framework of transnational governance. There is also within this framework a strong geo 
political element: both Thailand and Singapore have close security links with the US and 
have been crucial to the so-called war on terror. It is these geopolitical hubs that are crucial in 
the emerging system of transnational regulatory governance. True enough, the US is weaving 
a complex hub and spoke architecture within the region, strongly reminiscent of cold war 
strategies, but at the same time this hub and spoke arrangement depends to a great extent on 
the creation of ‘regional nodes’ such as Singapore, which are used as a means of integrating 
other states within the region to new regulatory forms of governance.   
Finally, one of the under explored features of bilateralism is that it accommodates and 
allows the negotiation of the complex interests of domestic capital within the global political 
economy. As we move from an international to a global economy it becomes impossible to 
counterpose the interests of domestic capital to foreign capital. Domestic capital itself is 
fractured and connected to the global economy and global capital. From this perspective, it is 
impossible to draw a simplistic typology of protectionist and internationalist interest within 
the capitalist class, because capital (both foreign and domestic) has contradictory and mixed 
interests in various foreign economic policies. And more to the point, these contradictory 
interests are played out within the state, and bilateralism provides a means of accommodating 
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this complex play of interests. Again at the heart of this new transnational regulatory 
governance is the fact that the tensions and contradictions of global capitalism are mirrored in 
conflicts inside the state as foreign economic policy is effectively nationalised. Ravenhill 
notes that one of the major reasons for FTAs within the Asia Pacific has been due to the fact 
that the  
increased interest of business groups in preferential trade agreements was stimulated by the 
growth of such arrangements elsewhere and the start of schedules for their implementation. 
Domestic business interests found themselves disadvantaged in markets where their 
competitors enjoyed preferential access (Ravenhill 2004: 65).  
At the same time the wide range of exclusions allowed by the FTA has enabled sections of 
domestic capital to protect certain key interests. The point then is that global economy means 
that the ‘concept of the domestic bourgeoisie is related to the process of internationalization, 
and does not refer to a bourgeoisie “enclosed” within a “national” space’ (Poulantzas 1978: 
74). lt is the complex interplay between domestic and foreign capital that is accommodated 
through the growth of the new bilateralism. Perhaps the most interesting dimension of this 
new bilateralism is the means through which it provides for the incorporation of economic 
and military globalisation within the new framework of transnational regulatory governance. 
In the next section the wide array of regulatory forms that distinguish the transnational 
regulatory governance will be discussed in more detail.  
MODALITIES OF THE TRANSNATIONAL REGULATORY GOVERNANCE:  
CONTRACTS, NETWORKS, AND ZONES OF GOVERNANCE  
Contractual governance  
This new transnational regulatory governance brings in its wake new forms and modalities of 
governance that fundamentally transforms ‘Westphalian’ modes of sovereignty. At the outer 
edges of this new state of exception one finds the surprising re-emergence of the notion of 
trusteeship.5 Trusteeship, a concept of the late colonial state, has made a surprising return to 
political theory and practice. Trusteeship depends on the exercise of unconstrained executive 
power, and indeed, it is this operation of executive immunity that is most amply demonstrated 
in the cases of Kosovo, East Timor, as well as the intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq. For 
example, the internationally appointed Ombudsperson in Kosovo makes a case ‘to place 
Kosovo completely outside the purview of any international human rights monitoring or 
judicial mechanisms, where it will remain for the conceivable future’ (quoted in Bowring 
2002: 14). This provides a striking example of the operation of a global state of exception 
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unencumbered by legislative or judicial framework. At the same time, in the case of the 
trusteeship there is an apparent recalibration of the practice of international equality that 
participation in the international community is contingent on meeting certain standards or 
values. As a result, failure to meet these standards will ensure that the protection of the 
international legal order will not be extended to those members of the international 
community. Indeed this trusteeship goes along with the contemporary rendering of a colonial 
version of  
“mission civilisatrice”—the colonial-era belief that that the European imperial 
powers had a duty to ‘civilize’ their overseas possessions. Although modern peace 
builders have abandoned the archaic language of civilised versus uncivilized, they 
nevertheless appear to act upon the belief that one model of domestic 
governance—liberal market democracy—is superior to all others (Paris 2002: 
638).  
In this new era where legitimacy trumps legality, membership of the international community 
becomes that is granted as a privilege rather than as one of ‘right’; a notable and the most 
decisive change in the Westphalian system of sovereignty. 
While trusteeship as an international practice is manifest at the outer edges of the 
global order, many more states are subject to various forms of global governance. These 
states, while not subject to trusteeship condition, nevertheless impose strict conditions on 
membership of the international community. One of the features of this new governance is 
the emergence of new forms of ‘contractual governance’—term used here in a very broad 
sense to signify implicit or explicit contracts. This is obvious in the familiar governance 
programs of International Financial Institutions (IFIs), but is also evident in such instances as 
the accession agreements between EU candidate member states and the EU to meet an agreed 
set of preconditions or standards in order to gain the benefits of membership of a particular 
international regime or organization.  
Further, this contractual governance works through ‘chains of contract’ where, for 
example, one international (the World Bank) or regional entity delegates policy authority to a 
domestic agency which in turn imposes a further set of contractual obligations on public or 
private sector organizations. Take for instance, the Basle Accord on capital adequacy which 
works through the adoption of best practice standards by national regulatory authorities and 
implementation of compliance regimes by individual private sector entities. Another example 
is the money laundering standards; here again, ‘best practice’ standards are implemented by 
local regulatory authorities who in turn impose compliance standards on individual financial 
entities.  
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 Another important element of the new contractual governance is the way in which 
transnational agencies set broad flexible goals which are then progressively enforced and 
supervised down a chain to national and sub national levels. In this context, Weber notes that 
‘these trends and transformations that “local” social policy (particularly of low income states) 
have increasingly come to be set and defined at the level of global institutions’ (Weber 2001: 
13). These chains of contract form a very important aspect of global governance. As 
Cammack observes, these ‘chains’ are linked through a succession of contracts and 
partnerships at lower levels which are required to assume ownership of the program. As he 
notes, with reference to the World Bank’s comprehensive development framework:  
In this broader context, it is the fundamental goal of the Bank’s strategy to impose 
‘country ownership’ of the CDF both because it recognises that it lacks the means 
to enforce the strategy itself, and because the legitimation of its project vis a vis 
its citizens around the world depends upon its adoption by national governments, 
which remain indispensable intermediaries in the project for global governance 
(Cammack 2002: 37). 
In fact, the obligation to assume ‘country ownership’ is built into the very institutional 
architecture of the World Bank/IMF poverty reduction strategy. Hence, while participation 
and empowerment are the catchwords for these strategies, it remains tied to a very specific 
model of economic participation and independence.  
These ‘chains of contract’ have the effect of internationalising the state. Within this 
new institutional architecture local agencies and organisations are the conduits through which 
international standards are transmitted. For example, in the poverty reduction strategy the 
very flexibility that social policy programs give local agencies is set against the broader 
constraints of general guidelines around which all local programs must be constructed. In the 
policy literature parlance this builds into the governance of social policy programs in a form 
of multi level governance. But the most important ramification of this multi level governance 
lies in the very internationalisation of component elements of the state structure.  
 
Network governance  
At the same time, regulatory and governance resources are dispersed outside the narrow 
precincts of the national system. Within a framework of globalisation, domestic governance 
often requires the cooperation, monitoring, and compliance with actors and agencies within 
the broader global system. To give one example, the growing complex global financial 
markets require an almost equally complex process of harmonisation of securities regulation. 
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But this legal harmonisation can only be achieved by institutionalised structures of 
cooperation between networks of specific domestic and international agencies—networks and 
institutions that operate relatively independent of traditional centres of executive authority, 
and operate at the interstices of the domestic and international.  
As we move beyond the confines of the ‘Westphalian state’ the meta governance of 
the emerging system of regulatory networks becomes one of the hallmarks of the governance 
of the new transnational regulatory state. As the state becomes fragmented, domestic 
regulatory agencies develop connections with their foreign counterparts as well as with 
transnational regulatory bodies, thereby taking on a ‘global’ function, Hence, we need to 
understand network governance as a set of ‘governance webs’ that encompass both domestic 
and transnational actors; it is within these webs that new forms of relational capacity are 
being constituted.  
It is important to understand that these regulatory webs often do not depend on formal 
international treaties or rely on international organisations for their enforcement. Rather, the 
emergence of an international regulatory state depends on, and in fact, requires, the active 
participation of agencies within the state. This again draws pointed attention to the 
importance of the reconstitution of sovereignty in these new systems of global regulation. 
Following the work of Picciotto (1996), this may be understood as a form of ‘network 
governance’ whose operations6 rely on the application of formal standards (soft law) rather 
than a set of legal rules; but more importantly, the operation of these regulatory systems 
depend on the ‘national’ application of internationally formulated standards. In this regard, it 
bears out Slaughter’s (1997) contention that the reconstitution of sovereignty represents the 
nationalisation of international law. What this signifies is that the operation of the global 
economy requires extensive regulatory changes at the national level. However, what is 
significant in these new regulatory frameworks is the interpenetration of specific public and 
private agencies in regulatory governance, thereby creating a complex multi layered system 
of regulation. 
Governing Zones of disorder  
At a deeper level, transnational regulatory governance reorganises the spaces of the global 
polity into zones of normality or exception. To use Ong’s (2002) rather revealing 
terminology, it suggests a ‘new spatiality’ that points to anthropological texturing of spaces 
of order and disorder. In an earlier analysis of sovereignty Ong (1999), with her notion 
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‘graduated sovereignty’ presents a perspective on the transformation of sovereignty. 
Graduated sovereignty, which has broader applicability than the Southeast Asian focus of 
study, refers to the way in which ‘the state flexibly manages different population segments 
located in various zones of sovereignty, or a system of graduated sovereignty that is 
superimposed on the conventional arrangements of national states in Southeast Asia’ (Ong 
1999: 224)  
One of the main effects of this new sovereignty is the development of what Ong calls 
‘zoning technologies’, that is, the use of various forms of political technologies to demarcate 
zones of governance. This serves to: 
identify recent state strategies in Southeast Asia that focus not on an overall developmental 
project but rather on the management of spaces and populations in order to achieve 
developmental ends. In Malaysia, for instance, post developmental strategies in the 1980s 
regulate spaces and populations according to their relationship to modes of global 
production (Ong 2004: 7). 
It seems clear that in a wide variety of areas ranging from the special economic zones of 
greater China—which is the subject of Ong’s analysis—to the way in which Southeast Asian 
governments such as the Philippines have managed to declare zones of emergency now 
thought to be more prone to ‘terrorist’ action. It is the operation of zoning technologies that is 
most evident in the various counter terrorism operations that are aimed at disrupting what are 
termed the ‘functional spaces’ of terrorism. Functional space is defined as the ability to carry 
out various activities in support of various organisations (Ramakrishna 2004). But of course, 
defining functional space in this way serves to criminalize all manner of activity from finance 
to the ability to travel. More to the point, these functional spaces all extend to the ideological 
and political space that allows these organizations to flourish. From this perspective ‘a 
counter terrorism thrust is needed to close the network’s all important political space …’ 
(Ramakrishna 2004: 325). In all these examples, one can see the operation of the kinds of 
zoning technologies that Ong describes to distinguish between normal political space and 
those spaces that are subject to police action and monitoring. In short, in distinguishing 
between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ political space one sees the operation of an important zoning 
technology. And here is the issue: these spaces of exception are subject to exceptional and 
emergency measures that operate outside the normal legal and constitutional processes. It is 
these zoning technologies that distinguish the new complex sovereignty in Southeast Asia.  
This differential governance of social and economic life that shapes this graduated 
sovereignty represents the kind of re-ordering of global and regional space that the state of 
exception entails. In essence, what this suggests is that at the global level various state and 
 16
non state actors are subject to the blunt edge of sovereign decision while others remain within 
a zone of legal or normal order. Moreover, it needs to be recognised that this mapping of the 
global order in ‘spatial terms’ implies a significant departure from the usual state-centric 
notions of the international system. This is mainly because these spaces of exception do not 
merely encompass traditional interstate relations, but also include a broad array of non state 
actors within and without the traditional boundaries of the national state. From a political 
economy perspective, this reordering reflects what Robertson, Bonal and Dale (2002) call 
‘rescaling’ of the levels of governance so that: 
shifting scales involves the active construction and reconstruction of territories for 
the purposes of governing. In particular, issues that appear fundamental at one 
scale disappear entirely from view at another; factions that are active participants 
at one scale can fade from the scene or even change at another’ (Robertson, Bonal 
& Dale (2002: 472). 
‘Rescaling governance’ is another term used to depict the increasing contested forms of 
spatial ordering provided by social theorists such as Lefebvre (1991) and Harvey (1999). In 
these analyses of space and power spatial structures are not just given, but are constantly 
produced and reproduced. At the same time, this ‘spatial reordering’ goes beyond mere 
economic governance to encompass new forms of political rule. However, what is distinctive 
about the global order in the state of exception is the primacy given to a ‘spatial location’ 
within the global order itself as a way of organizing political order within the global system.  
CONCLUSION  
This essay provides a theoretical framework to understand recent changes in the relationship 
between the US and Southeast Asia. Some have suggested that the events of September 11 
have led to a new imperialism or a more military assertive role for the US in Southeast Asia. 
The problem with this approach to US-Southeast Asia relations is that it assumes a broadly 
‘outside-in’ perspective on US external pressure. To the extent that the state is conceptualised 
in these accounts it is very much a state centric view of external subordination. While this 
might have some radical and even ‘third worldist’ overtones, it remains very much a realist 
understanding of the global political economy. In contrast, this paper suggests that the 
dynamics of these undoubtedly important external influences are to be found within the 
internal transformation of the state. Approaching it from this inside-out perspective allows us 
to locate the dynamics of the new global order in the internal transformation of the state. In 
terms of this analysis the events of September 11 do not so much reflect the growth of a new 
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imperialism as a consolidation of new forms of transnational structures and regulatory forms 
that remain—even while it may be dominated by the US—much more than a simple assertion 
of US political power. It is here that Kautsky’s notion of utra imperialism allows us to 
understand this new global order as a form of transnational regulatory governance that works 
through the instantiation of regulatory disciplines within the state.  
Central to this internal transformation of the state is the emergence of a new 
transnational regulatory governance. Increasingly, the emergent global economy—because 
globalisation is a microeconomic process—requires regulation of areas previously considered 
to be in the domestic domain. Globalisation brings with it a new ensemble of governance 
institutions; it is these new structures that shape and influence the architecture of the state. A 
central feature of this new transnational regulatory governance is that the distinction between 
external and internal—which is one of the founding binaries of the Westphalian state—
becomes increasingly problematic as domestic regulatory agencies develop connections with 
their foreign counterparts as well as with transnational regulatory bodies, thereby taking on a 
‘global’ function. Hence we need to understand network governance as a set of ‘regulatory 
webs’ that encompass both domestic and transnational actors. It is within these webs that new 
forms of governance are being constituted. It is important to understand that these regulatory 
webs often do not depend on formal international treaties or on international organisations for 
their enforcement. Rather, the emergence of transnational regulatory governance depends on, 
and in fact, requires, the active participation of agencies within the state—a fact which once 
again draws pointed attention to the importance of the reconstitution of sovereignty in these 
new systems of global regulation. It is the nature and analysis of this new ultra imperialism in 
the post Westphalian state- that needs to be at the heart of the research agenda of international 





1. For similar versions of this notion of set of interconnected executive structures see Jayasuriya 
(1999), Agnew & Corbridge (1995)  
2. For a discussion of the notion of the fragmented or regulatory state see Jayasuriya (1994a; 1998). 
It is important to note that these agencies have relationships with specialized domestic and 
international constituencies. 
3. I follow Poggi (1978) in using the term ‘internal sovereignty’ to describe the development of this 
internal coherence within the state. 
4. Another way of looking at this is to see the state as an entity that is increasingly functionally 
differentiated. Much of the dominant literature in international relations and law perceives the 
state as an undifferentiated entity.  
5. See for example Lugard (1929) for an outline of these ideas in a colonial context.  
6. Picciotto’s analysis of the legal governance of regulatory cooperation is a pioneering attempt to 
grapple with some of the major theoretical and empirical issues raised by regulatory cooperation. 
Zaring’s (1997) recent work on international financial organisation is also an excellent overview 
of the implications for international law of regulatory cooperation. Of course, there is an 
extensive international political economy literature on these issues. See, for example, Underhill 
(1995) who stresses the importance of network governance. 
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